Foreword
The methods that banks use to account for credit losses in their loan portfolios are of great importance for the presentation of banks' financial positions in their financial statements. Accounting for credit losses is, therefore, an area of significant interest for banking supervisors worldwide. Furthermore, banks need loan classification or grading systems in order to monitor and manage the credit risk in their loan portfolios. In a number of countries, banking supervisors have introduced standardized requirements for classifying loans in specified categories based on the loans' credit quality. In many countries, these classifications are used for regulatory reporting to facilitate regulators' assessments of the level of credit risk in banks' loan portfolios. In many non-G-10 countries, these classifications are also used to quantify provisioning requirements. 1 Working Group participants included Alain Laurin and Giovanni Majnoni (coordinators), Gabriella Ferencz, Samuel Munzele Maimbo, Rashmi Shankar, and Fatouma Toure Ibrahima Wane. 2 The CPLG was established in 1996 so that Basel members as well as bank supervisors from non-G-10 countries could exchange views on universally applicable bank supervision standards. This endeavor resulted in adoption of the Core Principles for Effective Supervision in 1997. Since then, the CPLG has met regularly to discuss bank supervision issues. The CPLG includes Australia, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, the West African Monetary Union, the European Commission, the Financial Stability Institute, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
Introduction
Loan classification refers to the process banks use to review their loan portfolios and assign loans to categories or grades based on the perceived risk and other relevant characteristics of the loans. The process of continual review and classification of loans enables banks to monitor the quality of their loan portfolios and, when necessary, to take remedial action to counter deterioration in the credit quality of their portfolios. It is often necessary for banks to use more complex internal classification systems than the more standardized systems that bank regulators require for reporting purposes and that are intended to facilitate monitoring and interbank comparisons. Unless explicitly stated, this report discusses regulatory classification systems, not internal classification systems.
From an accounting perspective, loans should be recognized as being impaired, and necessary provisions should be made, if it is likely that the bank will not be able to collect all the amounts due?principal and interest?according to the contractual terms of the loan agreement(s). Loan loss provisioning is thus a method that banks use to recognize a reduction in the realizable value of their loans. Bank managers are expected to evaluate credit losses in their loan portfolios on the basis of available information-a process that involves a great deal of judgment and is subject to opposing incentives. Sometimes banks may be reluctant to account for the whole amount of incurred losses because of the negative effect of provisions on profits and on shareholders' dividends. In other cases, if provisions are tax-deductible, banks have an incentive to overstate their loss provisions and to smooth profits over time in order to reduce the amount of tax liability.
Both loan classification and provisioning present a number of conceptual and practical challenges, and diverse systems are used in different countries. Though similarities exist, there is a lack of internationally recognized definitions. For example, the terms specific provisions and general provisions are present in many regulatory frameworks, but their definitions and uses vary across countries. As a result of these differences, the definition of regulatory capital in different institutional frameworks varies and makes it difficult to interpret crucial financial ratios, especially when comparing banks' financial performance across countries. There are also differences i n the amount of time that elapses before a loan is considered past due and in the extent of provisioning applied to impaired loans with the same characteristics and risk profile.
Being aware of these differences is crucial to interpreting banks' financial and capital ratios correctly.
Regardless of prevailing rules, the provisioning and loan classification process is often a matter of judgment. Thus, assessments may vary markedly between different assessors -such as bank managers, external auditors, and bank supervisors -and across countries. Also, the national legal infrastructure affects the timely enforcement of the terms of loan contracts. For example, in countries with a strong legal infrastructure loans tend to be classified as past due relatively soon after the borrower misses a payment. In countries where the quality of the legal infrastructure is weak, however, the period between an omitted payment and the revision of the loan classification may be longer.
Approaches also differ concerning whether and how collateral should be considered when classifying loans and determining the appropriate provisions. Not all regulatory frameworks recognize the same forms of collateral, and there is no consensus on the evaluation criteria of pledged assets, fo r example, according to their marketability. All these elements make it difficult to compare countries' rules on loan classification and provisioning.
Although the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has issued standards on asset valuation and disclosure, it has not yet provided detailed guidance on loan provisioning. As a result, countries that implement the International Accounting Standards still have different loan loss provisioning regulatory frameworks.
The Basel Committee is also paying increasing attention to accounting and auditing issues, as evidenced by the committee's analyses of and comments on important documents drafted by other bodies 3 and by its development of sound practices papers. Of particular interest in this context is the Basel Committee's paper "Sound Practices for
Loan Accounting and Disclosure" (July 1999). This paper, which provides important guidance on loan accounting, accounting for credit losses and disclosure was drafted to be consistent with IAS 39, "Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement."
Even though the Basel Committee's paper provides sound principles, it is too early to determine the extent to which it will result in a more consistent approach to loan classification and provisioning across countries. As noted in the paper, there is neither a uniform loan classification technique, nor a standard procedure to assess loan risk.
Furthermore, several concepts are susceptible to different interpretation. For example, the notion of "objective evidenc e" referred to in the paper involves mainly backward-looking criteria at a time when supervisors (such as those in Spain) envisage adopting a more forward-looking approach.
Despite the trend toward harmonization of bank regulations made possible by the Basel Committee's endeavors, and given the complexity of the desirable features of loan classification and provisioning policies, it may be difficult to develop a consensus on the most suitable type of regulation in these areas.
The Basel Committee is currently developing a new Capital Accord ("Basel II").
This effort is aimed at increasing the risk sensitivity of capital requirements and providing incentives for banks to improve risk management. The new Capital Accord is likely to be a factor of change t oward better classification regimes, as banks will be required to implement systems that separate loans into categories based on the probability of default. Thus, it is expected that a greater homogeneity of classification systems will follow from the adoption of criteria that are less dependent on subjective judgment and more on objective quantitative factors.
This paper provides an overview of loan classification and provisioning practices in a sample of countries at different levels of economic development. The survey conducted for the paper is not the first one to explore national loan classification and provisioning practices, but it does have the distinctive feature of comparing the regulatory approaches adopted by developed and developing economies. Thus, it is a useful complement to other sources of information that focus on either developed or developing countries.
Although the sample-members of the Basel Core Principles Liaison Group-is limited in scope, it provides a broad representation of countries that differ in size, location, and level of financial development.
Differences in provisioning and classification approaches have often made it difficult to compare bank and banking system weaknesses across regulatory regimes, making peer pressure and market discipline less effective. In some instances, poor classification and provisioning practices have led to solvency ratios giving a false sense of security, as noted when apparently "adequately" capitalized financial systems failed in the 1990s. These differences, though, are not just the result of inadequate coordination among national supervisors. At times, they address specific needs of financial systems at different levels of development. Successful regulatory harmonization therefore needs to recognize these conflicting features by defining a set of minimum standards for loan classification that are grounded in sound risk management practices but also sufficiently general to recognize differences in national economic and legal environments. The evidence provided by this survey is intended as a contribution to this difficult task.
Regulatory and Supervisory Authority for Loan Classification and Provisioning Rules
With no international standard, national authorities and bank supervisors have designed their own regulations on loan classification and provisioning according to the specific nature of their regulatory environment.
In some countries, the rules are developed by private sector accounting standardsetting bodies; in others, the rules are issued by Parliament, the Ministry of Finance, or the banking regulator. In countries where the accounting rules for banks are not made by the banking regulators, regulators are normally consulted or offered an opportunity to comment on proposed changes in the rules (Table 1) . 
1991
Yes (1996 and 1999) a. In the UK, although there is no regulation on how firms should classify loans, supervisors expect firms to have a mechanism for identifying impaired assets and for determining the adequacy of their provisions. b. The U.S. banking agencies have issued loan classification standards as part of their examination procedures rather than as a regulation. 
Loan Classification
Even a cursory review of classification systems reveals the absence of international consensus on loan classification approaches. The approaches used to classify loans are considered either a manage ment responsibility or a regulatory matter. Among G-10 banking regulators, the United States and, to some extent, Germany use a classification approach. In countries with no detailed regulatory classification regime, bank managers are normally responsible for developing necessary internal policies and procedures to classify loans. A typical view in such countries is that in this area the role of external parties-including supervisors and external auditors-should be restricted to providing an opinion on whether banks' policies are adequate and if they are implemented in a satisfactory and consistent way.
In the United Kingdom, the supervisor does not require banks to adopt any particular form of loan classification. Nevertheless, supervisors do expect banks to have a proper risk management process, including prudent appraisal of loans, which should be updated regularly. There is no recommendation on the number of classification categories banks should use, but that does not preclude supervisors from instructing banks to revise their classification systems. In the Netherlands, there is no regulatory requirement for loan classification, leaving bank managers to devise their own groupings, which are periodically reviewed by supervisors. France has enacted a system based on minimum requirements for loans to be considered impaired (doubtful) without issuing any prescriptive guidance on classification (loans are either normal or impaired). It is up to banks to work out internal classifications. A similar approach is used in Italy, where five types of loans are considered, but only general guidance is provided for implementation.
Though they also emphasize market discipline and managers' judgment, some G-10 countries have opted for a more prescriptive approach. For example, the U.S. system classifies loans into five categories based on a set of criteria ranging from payment experience to the environment in which the debtor evolves. This system seeks to curb the risk of excessive bank discretion, even though some judgmental inputs play a crucial role.
The adoption of this system by many countries points to the usefulness of a structured approach that facilitates the supervisor's ability to analyze and compare banks' loan portfolios. Such a system could also provide an input for banks and supervisors when discussing whether adequate provisions have been made. However, the adoption of such systems has not resulted in identical frameworks because supervisors have customized their approaches to fit their environments. For example, German banks are expected to classify certain loans into four categories (loans with no discernible risk, loans with increased latent risk, nonperforming loans, and bad loans). Japan recently formulated new guidelines on loan classification to enhance inspection and supervision and, in turn, the credibility of the country's financial system.
Many non-G-10 countries have adopted loan classification systems of varying complexity (with the number of loan categories ranging from three to nine) to capture increasing risk and diminishing recovery prospects. Where inadequate classification is common, supervisors have tried to establish detailed rules to encourage prudent behavior and help level the playing field.
Brazil has adopted a nine-category system and established a list of factors that banks should consider when classifying their loans. The list includes both qualitative and quantitative factors related to each loan, the debtor, and the environment in which the debtor operates. The Czech Repub lic has adopted a five-category system based on the number of days in arrears and a qualitative assessment based on updated financial information on the debtor. A new regulation, which should be adopted in 2003, will allow banks to determine provisioning requirements for certain group of loans on a portfolio basis. China strongly encourages banks to adopt a refined loan classification system and use the supervisory five-category loan classification system as a minimum. Spain has adopted a six-category classification system that implies a multifaceted review. Mexico's system involves several steps. It starts with an assessment of the debtor, which determines the classification within seven categories. Banks can then adjust their initial classification if adequate collateral can provide some comfort on the extent of the recovery. Singapore's classification system includes five grades. Several countries have enacted specific rules for residential mortgages (Chile, Mexico) and credit card loans (Mexico), given the peculiarities of these types of credit.
A term that is used in many loan classification regimes is "nonperforming loans" (NPL). However, this term has many different meanings. In some countries, nonperforming means that the loan is impaired. In other countries, it means that payments are past due, but there are significant differences among countries as to how many days a payment should be in arrears before past due status is triggered.
Nevertheless, a rather common feature of nonperforming loans appears to be that a payment is "more than 90 days" past due, especially for retail loans. Where the criteria for designating a loan as nonperforming are largely discretionary for banks, the comparability of NPL over time may be affected by changes that individual banks make to their definition of the term.
Loan classification criteria generally appear to rely both on ex-ante and ex-post signals of loan quality, although the balance between the two is difficult to ascertain. Expost criteria include the number of days a loan is past due and, more broadly, the current condition of the debtor. In most of the countries surveyed, the number of days of past-due payments represents a minimum condition for loan classification purposes, but other criteria, some of which exhibit forward-looking features, are considered as well. A satisfactory forward-looking approach, though, requires an accurate assessment of the expected probability of default and is therefore still uncommon.
Classification of Multiple Loans
A bank's exposure to an individual customer or to related parties often involves different types of loans, including short-term facilities and overdrafts, with different risk profiles. Although it is not unusual to observe different performances for different loans granted to the same borrower, difficulties with one loan could be a harbinger of the debtor's deteriorating financial condition, which is likely to affect other loans. In such cases, it is important for supervisors to avoid creating regulatory loopho les and to provide banks with clear rules on how to deal with multiple loans.
Classification methods for multiple loans to the same client vary by country, and different methods generate differences in provisioning. At one end of the spectrum, several countries (such as Brazil, Czech Republic, France, India, and South Africa) believe that once a loan is classified as impaired, all other loans to the same customer should be classified in that same category (Table 2 ). Australia's stance is even stricter as all loans granted to related parties in the same group must be treated in the same manner.
This provision, however, applies only to facilities that are cross-collateralized.
At the other end of the spectrum, other countries (for example, Korea, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia) take a more flexible approach. Banks' decisions are based on their reviews of each loan's performance, regardless of how the customer's other loans are rated. In Hong Kong, the decision to classify multiple loans to the same borrower is made on a loan-by-loan basis, depending on how each of them is collateralized and guaranteed. Still, a loan can be downgraded-say, by one notch-to account for the impairment of related loans. In Spain, all loans to the same customer are considered doubtful if accrued arrears on all the loans exceed 25 percent of the outstanding exposure. In Germany, while banks are expected to focus on borrower circumstances, not all loans are classified homogeneously. The other loans should be evaluated to determine whether one or more should be similarly classified. This determination should be based on an assessment of each individual loan's collectibility and the debtor's payment ability and performance with respect to that loan. The other loans are similarly reclassified.
Non-G-10

Hong Kong
Such decisions are at the discretion of individual banks, but downgrading is recommended. India
The other loans are similarly reclassified. Korea, Rep. of
The other loans are similarly reclassified. Exceptions are specified for high-quality loans.
Mexico
The other loans are not necessarily reclassified, but they cannot be classified in the three top categories.
Russian Federation
The other loans are similarly reclassified.
Saudi Arabia
The other loans are similarly reclassified. Singapore
The other loans are similarly reclassified for customers who are the principal borrowers. There may be exceptions when the customer is a joint borrower and repayment depends on the other borrower, who has demonstrated an ability to repay the loan.
South Africa
No effect except for retail loans. Spain All loans to the same customer are considered doubtful if accrued arrears on the same customer exceed 25 percent of the outstanding exposure. WAMU The other loans are similarly reclassified. a. There may be exceptions depending on the loan's nature, purpose, and volume and on the value and liquidity of the collateral.
Guarantees and Collateral
Determining the appropriate value of collateral is a common problem when provisioning for losses on impaired loans. If the collateral is assigned too high a value, the provision will be insufficient. Although collateral is potentially marketable, banks and, to some extent, supervisors may underestimate or ignore the obstacles caused by weak legal systems and cultural factors in the effective disposal of collateral.
Countries take varying approaches to the treatment of collateral and guarantees in the classification process (Table 3) . Several jurisdictions (Czech Republic, France, Spain, and West African Monetary Union (WAMU)) do not take collateral and guarantees into account for classification purposes. As a result, classifications reflect the quality of loans regardless of the prospects for recovery deriving from collateral. Far more countries explicitly factor in the value of collateral, in various ways, when classifying loans. The focus seems to be on estimating the amount of recovery. In Australia, loans with interest or principal 90 days past due must be recorded as nonaccrual if the market value of the security is insufficient to cover payment of principal and accrued interest. When the market value is sufficient, the loan should be classified as past due. In Mexico, the initial credit rating is upgraded by one notch if certain conditions are met, one of which is that the guarantor's rating must be higher than that of the debtor. In Singapore, the secured portion of a nonperforming loan is considered substandard, while the unsecured portion is graded as doubtful or a loss. In China, the declining value of collateral or the deterioration of the guarantor's financial condition is a trigger point that results in normal loans being downgraded, and different portions of a loan with an eligible guarantee can be classified differently based on the degree of protection that the underlying guarantee provides. In Japan, only assets secured by the safest collateral (those deemed to be of superior value) will not be reclassified, even when customers experience problems, on the assumption that banks are unlikely to incur any loss.
In many countries, collateral and guarantees are assessed and considered in making loan loss provisions. This is relevant to the extent that banks are able to seize and dispose of collateral within a reasonable period. It is not uncommon, however, for a collateral value to be used without any discount being applied over time-even when the results of banks' recovery attempts are uncertain. The collateralized portion of a loan is upgraded one notch if collateralized with real estate or property, two notches if it is in the form of securities; it is classified as standard if it is in the form of government debt.
Russian Federation
Formal criteria indicate that collateral should be taken into account in loan classification and provisioning. In addition, if bank managers decide to do so, unsecured and insufficiently secured loans may be classified as secured. Saudi Arabia General guidance is provided for valuation, which is used in provisioning but not classification. A nonperforming loan may be considered low risk if its net realizable value exceeds the loan's value. Singapore General guidance is provided for valuation and nonperforming loans. South Africa General guidance is provided for valuation. Spain Specific rules are provided for estimating the provisions of collateralized loans. WAMU Collateral does not play a role in loan classification; for provisioning, only collateral in the form of liquid financial assets and real estate is considered. The value of physical collateral is discounted by 50 percent after two years and fully discounted after the third year. a. Commission Bancaire has not issued specific guidance. b. A loan with interest or principal payments 90 days in arrears must be recorded as a nonaccrual item if the net current market value of the collateral is insufficient to cover the overdue principal and interest. Where the market value of the collateral is sufficient, the loan should be classified as a past-due item.
Key issues for collateral include the enforceability of foreclosure provisions and the likelihood of collateral collection. Australia's regulation mentions the enforceability of guarantees as a feature to take into account when setting provisioning levels. To offset the negative impact that collateral collection constraints may have on bank soundness, the Czech Republic requires banks to rapidly depreciate the value of real estate posted as collateral as past-due payments increase, lowering the value of real estate posted as collateral to zero after a year of past-due payments. Meanwhile, India requires a higher volume of provisions as past-due payments increase, raising the provision requirements for a doubtful loan from 20 to 50 percent in the first three years. In the WAMU, banks are exempt from provisioning the portion of a loan covered by physical collateral in the form of real estate for the first two years, but required to reach full provisioning, regardless of its valuation, at the end of the fourth year, with a minimum of 50 percent in the third year.
Loan Reviews by Banks
The timely review of loan quality for both classification and provisioning purposes is key to keeping management up to date on a loan portfolio's quality. In countries where accounting regulation requires loan review only for the preparation of the yearly financial statements, supervisors may find it necessary to require banks to review their loans more frequently.
All G-10 supervisors (except those in the United Kingdom) have issued rules on how and when banks are expected to review their loan portfolios (Table 4 ). In France, banks are expected to review every loan at least every quarter so that they can, at least for the largest exposures, regularly reassess their risk profiles. German banks must review all loans once a year. UK banks are required to outline their review process for different business lines in their provisioning policy statement. That way, supervisors can assess the frequency and depth of reviews for each type of lending. In the Netherlands, banks have to report on their provisioning levels twice a year, which implies that they must assess their portfolios at least every six months.
Most non-G-10 countries have similarly prescriptive provisions. For Brazilian banks, the review depends on loan delinquency. A monthly review is required for the most impaired loans, and an annual review for other exposures. In China and in the Czech Republic, loans are to be reviewed on a quarterly basis. Hong Kong requires an annual review for all but large exposures, which must be analyzed at least quarterly.
Russian supervisors require monthly reviews for loan portfolios, while the WAMU recommends a semi-annual review. In Australia, as in the UK, there is no formal banking regulatory requirement for the periodic review of individual loans, but individual bank practices are documented and assessed as part of the off-site and on-site review processes. 
Classification of Restructured Troubled Loans
According to the definition in the Basel Committee's 1999 Loan Accounting Paper, a loan is "a restructured troubled loan when the lender, for economic or legal reasons related to the borrower's financial difficulties, grants a concession to the borrower that it would not otherwise consider." Restructuring the terms of a loan may result in an impaired loan being upgraded even though an upgrade might not be justified. Without adequate safeguards, the extent of impairment could be concealed, since the improvement in quality expected from a bank's restructuring efforts could be unrealistic or even false.
Thus, it is worthwhile that regulatory classification regimes provide guidance in this regard-particularly in countries where banks often reschedule loans.
Because banks often must modify the initial conditions of a loan-for example, when the debtor is unable to service the debt according to the loan agreement-banks should know how these actions are to be accounted for. Since a lower interest rate or extended repayment schedule (or both) may help the debtor repay the debt, banks often offer these mechanisms to safeguard their assets. This phenomenon can also occur when banks renegotiate the terms of a loan as a result of improved market conditions for customers. Such renegotiations may not raise difficulties for prudential treatment, though thorny issues may still arise-such as whether it is necessary for banks to account for the losses. However, the issue of problem loans being restructured is far more complex.
Banks may offer new terms to customers who can no longer pay their debt. In such a case, the new terms may provide only temporary relief to the debtor and lead the way to additional concessions. In doing so, banks may try to conceal the extent of impairment.
Such "evergreening" practices, which include extending the credit facility without amending the contractual interest rate, are difficult to track unless bank supervisors implement proper reporting systems or investigate this issue during on-site examinations.
Most supervisors in G-10 countries do not provide any definition of restructured troubled loans, and they have not issued guidance on how such loans should be classified (Table 5) . Italian supervisors define restructured loans as those for which a borrower who was granted a moratorium on repayment in the previous 12 months renegotiates the debt at a below-market rate. If more than a year has elapsed, banks are required to determine whether the loan should be reclassified as substandard or bad debt. U.S. supervisors rely on the definition of a restructured loan provided by generally accepted accounting principles. Under that definition, debt is considered a troubled restructuring if the creditor, for economic or legal reasons related to the debtor's financial difficulties, grants a concession to the debtor that it would not otherwise consider.
Supervisors in non-G-10 countries, by contrast, provide specific criteria for banks to classify loans as restructured. Definitions often focus on loan rescheduling, whether it involves extending the loan's maturity or lowering its interest rate (or both). Either way, the goal is to enhance borrowers' ability to meet their obligations. Australian supervisors consider a loan to be restructured if there has been a reduction in its principal, in the amount due at maturity, in the interest rate (to below-market levels), or in accrued interest (including interest capitalization), or if it involves an extension of the maturity date or dates at an interest rate lower than the current market rate for new debt with similar risk.
In the Czech Republic, a loan is also considered restructured if the bank grants a new loan so that the customer can repay an impaired loan; after more than two years have elapsed from restructuring a loan can be rated as standard. In Australia, a restructured loan must be classified as nonaccrual if it does not yield interest equal to the bank's average cost of funding. In Brazil, restructured loans are also classified as nonaccrual or in a higher risk category, and a better grading cannot be granted until a significant amortization of the outstanding loan is achieved and sufficient evidence is provided to justify that decision. In WAMU, restructured loans are assumed to be doubtful unless the debtor is engaged in a restructuring agreement with all his major financial creditors and the terms of the agreement are respected. In the Russian Federation, all loans that have been restructured more than once-regardless of whether the initial loan agreement has been revised-are classified as substandard or risky (doubtful for loans rescheduled twice with amendments of the initial contract). In Singapore, restructured loans are initially rated substandard at best but can be upgraded to unimpaired if they comply with the restructured terms for at least a year. Except in the Russian Federation, where the number of reschedulings is explicitly referred to, the number of times a loan is restructured does not affect its classification. Assessments are based on loans' performance and prospects for recovery. 
Provisioning Issues
In many countries, the rules for loan loss provisioning do not aim to capture losses at an early stage, but rather to consider "objective" factors that could be taken into account by the fiscal authority. Some countries provide principle-based rules, with only general guidance on how to determine adequate provisioning. This approach is common in the European Union (Table 6 ). In contrast, countries that issue detailed regulations on loan classification often define quantitative minimum provisioning requirements. Most emerging markets take this approach. The rationale behind issuing detailed regulatory parameters could be to level the playing field or make bank regulations more easily enforceable. Among non-G-10 economies, provisioning requirements are usually defined in four or five categories, though Brazil (nine) and Mexico (seven) use more categories.
Australia takes an intermediate stance. Banks are allowed to set provisions based on their "internal model," while nonbank deposit-taking institutions are required to use parameters prescribed by the supervisor. Although banks may consider applying the supervisory parameters, it is generally expected that they have in place systems and procedures for assessing provisioning levels in line with the supervisor's prudential requirements.
Provisioning requirements may differ significantly for several reasons. One initial factor is, of course, the conceptual basis for provisioning requirements: Do they aim at addressing only losses that follow from visible and identifiable events, or do they aim at establishing provisions for probable losses? A related aspect is if only specific provisions are used or if general provisions are also permitted or required. Furthermore, the approaches differ as to whether the impairment is measured on the basis of discounted cash flows or undiscounted cash flows. One important aspect is if and how banks are expected to factor in the value of collateral. In many countries, the value of collateral is then subtracted from the required provisions to determine the level of the actual provisions to be established. General provisions are in several countries set at compulsory levels-as in Hong Kong, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, and Spain. In general, these provisions are not intended to reflect the quality problems of the loan portfolio deriving from realized events but rather aim at cushioning against future events.
The importance of loan loss classification and loan loss provisioning was heightened with the introduction of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. The Accord allowed the inclusion of general provisions as part of Tier II capital. However, most of the countries surveyed adopted a more restrictive approach tha n that specified in the Capital Accord. For instance, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Spain do not allow general provisions to be counted as part of Tier II capital (Table 8) . Where general provisions are permitted in Tier II capital, the limit is generally set at 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets, as defined by the Capital Accord. Only Argentina specifies that not more than half the amount of provisions set aside for normal or standardized assets can be counted as a component of regulatory capital. Over 6---Note: For classification purposes, "with collateral" means fully secured and "without collateral" means partly secured or unsecured. a. Loans can also be classified as doubtful if a bank decides that there is a probable risk of default or the loan is the subject of legal proceedings. Special mention loans are called past -due loans. b. Loans with no discernible risks, loans with increased latent risk, loan categorized as nonperforming, bad debt (i.e., losses). c. Nonperforming loans are grouped by decreasing order of risk into bad debts, substandard loans, loans being restructured, and restructured loans. Unsecured loans to borrowers from high -risk countries are treated as nonperforming. Bad debts are claims on insolvent borrowers. Substandard loans are claims on borrowers in temporary difficulty where at least 20 percent of the exposure is more than 6-12 months past due. Loans being restructured are loans where the debtor is indebted to several banks and has applied for consolidation in the previous year. Restructured loans are loans granted a moratorium on repayment and renegotiated at below-market rates. d. Based on the actual losses over the past three years of each category. e. The use of classification is not a legally binding requirement but rather a supervisory recommendation. f. At a minimum, banks must use these fiveclassification categories, but are encouraged to use a larger number, particularly in the pass category. g. Excludes public sector loans. Banks classify debtors, not loans. h. Impaired assets are grouped into nonaccrual items, restructured items. In addition, loans that are 90 days in arrears (on principal or interest) but that are well secured are classified as past -due items. i. The nine categories are AA (0 percent), A (0.5 percent), B (1 percent), C (3 percent), D (10 percent), E (30 percent), F (50 percent), G (70 percent), and H (100 percent). j. At present, from 1 percent up to 100 percent decided by banks. The supervisor require that banks set aside provisions based on the loan classification system in accordance with sound accounting principles. The numbers provided are to be introduced according to the new supervisory guidelines. k. Specific provision is made against the unsecured portion of the classified loans. l. Provisions for the secured portion of a loan are 20 percent if it is doubtful for up to one year, 30 percent if it is doubtful for one to three years, and 50 percent beyond three years. m. The seven categories are based on country risk, financial risk, industry risk, and payment experience. Uncollateralized A-1 loans require 0.5 percent provisions; A-2, 0.99 percent; B, 1-20 percent; C-1, 20-40 percent; C-2, 40-60 percent; D, 60 -90 percent; and E, 100 percent. n. Banks are allowed to determine their provisioning policy in consultation with external auditors. o. Banks are required to classify accounts based on the borrower's financials, creditworthiness, and/or repayment capability. Loans have to be classified as nonperforming once principal or interest is past due for three months or more. p. The entire asset, not just the late payments, is considered doubtful when it becomes 12 months overdue. q. The 0.5-1.0 percent "generic" provision is complemented by a "statistical provision for insolvency." r. Provisions on doubtful assets must equal 10 percent for payments more than 3 months overdue, 25 percent for more than 6 months, 50 percent for more than 12 months, 75 percent for more than 18 months, and 100 percent for more than 21 months. Late payments on mortgages are subject to a longer schedule. s. Doubtful loans include, in particular, the whole amount of each loan with at least one payment overdue for more than six months. The uncollateralized portion [must be fully provision-immediately and the remaining, according to the rules mentioned in Table 3 . 
Non-G-10
Yes
A 0.5-1.0 percent "generic" provision is complemented by a "statistical provision for insolvency" WAMU Yes Yes Left at the discretion of the banks a. Except for general provisions for country risk. b. Only for actual losses, provided they do not exceed the specific provision. Forty percent of actual losses are netted out, and the balance is compared with the specific provision against the loan or the part of the loan that is written off. c. General and specific provisions can be deducted within the annual limit of 0.6 percent of the loan portfolio up to a cumulative amount of 5 percent. d. Small banks, as defined in tax law, can choose to use a "reserve method" under which additions to the tax bad debt reserve are tax-deductible. The size of the tax bad debt reserve is based on a six-year moving average of loan write-offs as a percentage of loans. Banks not using the "reserve method" may deduct only their actual write-offs of specific individual loans. e. Provisions can be no greater than 5 percent of total income and 10 percent of average advances by rural banks. The regulatory framework does not consider general provisions, but the Act on Accountancy and the Tax Act make a distinction between specific and general provisions. f. Only 1 percent "generic" is deductible.
Several jurisdictions-Australia, the Czech Republic, France, Hong Kong, and the WAMU-explicitly mention that specific provisions reduce the amount of risk-weighed assets in the denominator of solvency ratios. It is not clear how many other economies allow specific provisions to be deducted from outstanding assets when computing capital requirements. minimum level of general provisions. Statistical provisions allow Spanish banks to set aside provisions-up to a ceiling consistent with EU regulation-that can be depleted when loan portfolio quality deteriorates.
Although many jurisdictions (Australia, Brazil, China, India, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) do not allow banks to spread provisions over long periods, several countries allow for regulatory discretion in the case of a banking crisis (Spain), ongoing bank restructurings, mergers, or takeovers (Argentina). Some countries have legal provisions for such exceptions, while others (the Netherlands) have specific provisions preventing them.
Specific provisioning requirements are often designed for certain portfolio segments, such as small loans (consumer and credit card lending) or loans exposed to sovereign risk. Several countries (Australia, France, Korea, the Netherlands, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore) do not require small loans to be classified and provisioned on an individual basis but allow them to be assessed on a pooled basis (Table 9 ). In Australia, for example, management is allowed to deal with small consumer loans on a portfolio basis. The general current practice i s for the write-off to occur at 180 days past due; therefore, the loans do not go through the "specific provision" stage. A few countries (Argentina, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain) also have separate provision requirements for country risk.
Monitoring and Enforcement
This section discusses the enforcement of regulations as reported by the surveyed supervisory authorities and therefore does not represent a third-party assessment. In general, the enforcement of rules and regulations is a sensitive issue that supervisors confront daily. Supervision requires considerable competence and judgment by bank supervisors and is not just the implementation of administrative rules. Efficient supervision depends on the right combination of supervisory powers, including sanctions Yes When a country is experiencing political, social, or economic conditions leading to an interruption in debt servicing by obligors within the country, or when an interruption in payments appears imminent, the U.S. banking agencies will designate credits within the country as Other Transfer Risk Problems or will classified them substandard, value-impaired, or loss. The agencies determine whether an Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve is required for particular international loans, and, if so, the amount of the reserve, based on whether the loans have been impaired by a protracted inability of obligors in a foreign country to make payments on their external indebtedness or whether no definite prospects exist for the orderly restoration of debt service.
Retail loans (including consumer loans, credit cards, and loans secured by residential real estate) are classified based on delinquency status.
Non-G-10
Argentina Yes 100 percent capital requirement for noninvestment grade countries; usual rule for investment grade countries. Table 6 ).
Saudi Arabia
No Some banks may take the pooled approach for retail and consumer loans, including credit cards. Singapore No Local banks have made provisions to counter the potential risks from their exposure to the region's economies. For foreign banks that operate in Singapore, provisions for country risk are usually subject to the policies of their head offices.
Banks generally make general provisions for retail loans on a pooled basis.
South Africa No Spain
Yes For countries classified as highly doubtful, provisions should reach no less than 50 percent in the first year, 75 percent in the second, and 90 percent in the third. For countries classified as doubtful, provisions should reach no less than 20 percent in the first year and 35 percent in the second year. For risks with countries in temporary difficulties, a provision of not less than 15 percent shall be applied. WAMU Yes Domestic sovereign risk provisioning is optional, but recommended under certain circumstances. Other country risk provisioning crit eria are left to the banks, but more than three months' overdue accrued interest must be fully provisioned.
Outstanding off-balance sheet commitments on doubtful clients must also be provisioned.
a. Loans to central and local governments, call loans, bonds under repurchase agreements, and interbank loans are classified as normal. In other countries such as the United Kingdom, while supervisory authorities periodically review banks' manuals, internal controls, operational polices, and credit control and monitoring systems, they may contract with third parties for on-site assessments. A common approach is to incorporate the work of external auditors into the assessment process-as in the Czech Republic, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
An interesting approach taken in Argentina, Brazil, France and Spain, for example, is the use of credit registers to provide ongoing monitoring and surveillance of loan portfolios. For example, Argentine banks must file monthly reports with the credit register on the composition and evolution of their loan portfolios. In Brazil, the central bank uses a credit risk center to gather monthly data on the credit operations of banks for clients with total liabilities of at least US$2,500. In Spain, the central bank uses a credit risk register to gather monthly data on the credit operations of banks for clients with total exposures of at least €6.000. In France and Italy, data from the credit registers are commonly used as a supervisory tool in both on-site and off-site supervision.
Improper loan classification and provisioning are reflected in disclosure of inaccurate or misleading information to supervisory authorities, shareholders, and the market in general. Most jurisdictions lack specific sanctions for such breaches of loan classification and provisioning regulations. Therefore, supervisors issue reprimands or enforce corrective action or sanctions on the basis of general or targeted requirements given in corporate law or in banking and financial sector legislation.
Corporate law gives directors and auditors certain rights and obligations to ensure that financial statements provide a fair statement of a bank's financial position, complying with adequate provisioning practices. Banking and financial legislation often provides specific penalties for violations of prudential regulations in general and of the banking and financial services act specifically (Table 10) 
The Tax Treatment of Loan Loss Provisions
The tax deductibility of loan losses provides a strong incentive to set aside adequate loan loss provisions. Thus, the tax treatment of loan provisions needs to strike a delicate balance between tax deductions that boost provisions (at the cost of lower tax revenues) and over-restrictive tax rules that result in inadequate loan loss reserves, which can raise fiscal costs subsequently in the event of a banking crisis. Increasing international convergence on the criteria underlying the risk classification of bank loans for capital regulation provides a useful basis for more efficient accounting and fiscal treatment of loan provisions. The common interest of bank supervisors and fiscal authorities in properly assessing the deterioration of a bank's loan portfolio can inspire the convergence of prudential and fiscal regulation on loan loss valuation.
Three broad approaches can be used to describe the tax deductibility of loan losses:
• Under the write-off approach, loans are tax-deductible only when they are declared uncollectible and are written off the bank's books.
• Under the specific provisions approach, specific provisions are fully or partly tax-deductible.
• Under the general provisions approach, banks can take a deduction for general provisions up to a predefined percentage of eligible loans.
The write-off approach is over-restrictive if regulation does not allow banks to writeoff loans before all means of collection and all legal actions to execute the collateral have been exhausted. In many countries, i nefficiencies in the judicial system unduly postpone the accounting recognition of losses in income statements relative to the period when they were effectively incurred. If partial write-offs are allowed, this approach is more like the specific provisions approach.
The write-off approach and the specific provisions approach are the most common.
The write-off approach is used by Australia, Korea, the Netherlands, and the United States (Table 11 ). The specific provisions approach is used by almost all the other economies surveyed. Apart from a few countries that have set limits on deductible provisions, there is flexibility in the amount of provisions. Among countries that set limits on tax deductibility, India allows deductibility up to 5 percent of annual income and 5 percent of assets deemed losses or doubtful by the Reserve Bank of India; Korea up to the minimum regulatory ratio; Mexico up to 2.5 percent of the loan portfolio; and South Africa up to 25 percent of the sum of capital and interest of doubtful loans. China's limit, 1 percent of outstanding loans, is being reconsidered.
The general provisions approach is less common. This approach is used by the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, and Singapore. Limits are always defined for the deductibility of general provisions and often for specific provisions as well. Germany sets no limits for specific provisions but requires general provisions not to exceed 60 percent of average loan losses over the past five years. Italy has a cumulative limit on the tax deductibility of specific and general provisions equal to 0.5 percent of outstanding loans on an annual basis, provided that loan loss reserves are less than 5 percent of outstanding loans. In France, provisions on loans to foreign borrowers that fall into the category of country risk are granted tax deductibility, but general provisions are not. It is also generally understood that revenues on nonaccrual assets are not taxed.
Among non-G-10 countries, the Czech Repub lic has used a scale of allowed deductibility for specific provisions related to loan classifications, with a ceiling of two per cent of the total amount of loans and loan guarantee; no deductions are allowed for general provisions (see Table 11 ). Singapore has a tax-deductible limit for general 
Disclosure
It is generally expected that banks will act more prudently if they are required to publicly disclose information on their appetite for risk, on the results of their activities, and on their future prospects. However, the extent of disclosure and market discipline depends on the economy's sophistication and its openness to market forces. Given the differences this paper has highlighted in rules for loan classification and provisioning, there is a strong case for requiring banks to publicly disclose comprehensive information on their accounting policies, risk management policies, and exposures.
4
The countries surveyed have diverse requirements for the disclosure of credit quality. In most G-10 countries banks are not required to provide the pub lic with detailed information on the quality of their loan portfolios. Usually, when specific classifications are required, supervisors do not expect banks to disclose them (Table 12) . Banks in the United States and Japan are required to disclose the amount of loans classified as nonaccrual. Detailed information on the quality of loans is considered confidentialunless market discipline (such as for listed banks) compels banks to divulge more information to investors and to the market. Many countries will have to significantly improve their disclosure rules to fulfill the aforementioned Basel Committee recommendations.
In non-G10 countries, the extent of disclosure imposed on banks for loan quality varies. Still, it is common for banks to be required to make public some information on the loan portfolio's breakdown, even though this information is not as comprehensive as that received by supervisors. For example, the Czech Republic requires banks to disclose the distribution of their loan portfolios between standard and classified loans and the 4 The Basel Committee has paid significant attention to this issue and has provided banks and supervisors with recommendations on disclosure that are included in several papers ("Enhancing Bank Transparency Requirements on disclosure for provisions tend to be much more uniform. In most countries, banks are required to provide information on the amount of provisions and the amount accrued in the year under review. Banks may also be asked to disclose details of loans being written off and the amount of recoveries on write-offs from previous years.
South Africa's accounting standard on disclosure?which all companies including banks must comply with?requires in-depth disclosure on accounting policies and loan quality.
Although bank supervisors may not be empowered to regulate bank disclosure, they are often involved in reviewing the adequacy of disclosure, including the accuracy of information on loan quality. Notwithstanding the role external auditors play in forming an opinion on banks' financial statements, supervisors ensure that banks do not provide a distorted view of their financial condition. Among G-10 countries, only French, U.S. and Japan regulators are empowered to ensure that banks publish timely information.
France's regulator can also instruct banks to publish amended statements if material omissions or inaccuracies have been detected. In the Czech Republic and Spain, bank supervisors not only check banks' compliance with accounting standards, they also regulate disclosure requirements.
Under several banking laws (Korea, Mexico, Russian Federation), supervisors can impose penalties for inaccurate disclosures. In practice most G-10 and non-G-10 argued that, because of the remuneration they receive from their customers, external auditors lack the required independence of judgment. Vested interests may impinge upon external auditor' ability to require clients to enforce prudent loan classification and loan loss provisions, especially during a banking crisis. 
Conclusion
Although most of the countries surveyed have improved their regulatory frameworks over the past decade, there has been little convergence toward a common loan classification model-though U.S.-like systems have been adopted by many developing and transition economies.
The absence of international consensus is evident in the varying number of loan classification categories; the treatment of multiple loans when one loan is in default; the inclusion or exclusion of loan guarantees and collateral values when classifying a loan; the level of supervisory involvement in the bank loan review processes; the treatment of restructured loans; the number of days used in defining past-due loans; the tax treatment of loan loss provisions; the backward-or forward-looking nature of losses to be provisioned for; and the often poor disclosure standards.
Notwithstanding the observed differences among national regulatory approaches the survey has clearly shown an increased awareness of the importance of proper loan classification and provisioning procedures among the participating countries, almost all of which have either introduced or updated their policies in the last decade. It is to be expected that a streamlining of provisioning approaches, more firmly grounded in sound risk management practices, will result from a more systematic reference to empirical measures of credit risk and from an integrated approach to expected and unexpected losses in the framework of the forthcoming Capital Accord.
